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THE PERSECUTOR BAR IN U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW:  
 TOWARD A MORE NUANCED UNDERSTANDING OF 
MODERN “PERSECUTION” IN THE CASE OF  
 FORCED ABORTION AND FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING 
Lori K. Walls† 
Abstract: Congress installed the persecutor bar to asylum seekers in the United 
States thirty years after the end of World War II to facilitate the deportation of Nazi war 
criminals.  The persecutor bar’s legal evolution was rooted in part in the practical 
difficulties of prosecuting crimes committed in the distant past.  The bar also is based on 
the notion, problematic in modern contexts, that persecution has a corollary persecutor. 
The persecutor bar does not map well to the messy political, cultural, and practical 
realities that give rise to modern “persecutors.”  Ten years ago, for example, forces from 
opposite ends of the political spectrum successfully lobbied to have two practices 
designated persecution under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)—forced 
abortion and female genital cutting (FGC).1  Given these designations, the persecutor bar 
automatically defines doctors who perform forced abortion and women who perform 
FGC as persecutors.  This comment argues that the political genesis of these changes to 
immigration law and the ill-fitting persecutor bar itself work to undermine the legitimacy 
of the persecutor label.  The bar as applied in modern contexts is at times over- or 
underinclusive in its reach.  The prosecution of persecutors in the context of civil war, 
although offering further examples of the way in which the persecutor bar is a blunt tool, 
suggests one solution.  For policy reasons, persecution is essentially uncoupled from the 
persecutor: those victimized by indiscriminate violence are ineligible for asylum while 
those who perpetrate this violence may be barred.  The independent consideration of 
persecuted and persecutor suggests a more nuanced understanding that better accounts for 
modern practices designated persecution.  This approach suggests one way of making 
more subtle immigration law’s now-simplistic approach to persecutors. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provision 
that bars a persecutor from being granted asylum mirrors the language that 
defines persecution for purposes of establishing asylum: the persecutor must 
persecute “on account of race, religion, national origin, political opinion, or 
social group”2 and the asylum seeker must be persecuted on one of these 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professor Stephen H. Legomsky, Washington University in St. 
Louis School of Law, for his encouraging mail in response to a question from a law student at a distant 
university; University of Washington School of Law Professors Kathleen O’Neill, Joel Ngugi, and Kristin 
Stilt; and the journal editorial staff. 
1
 This practice, described below, also is referred to as “female genital mutilation” (F.G.M.), a term 
Makau Wa Mutua convincingly argues “stigmatizes the practitioners and their cultures as barbaric 
savages.”  Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 201, 225 
(2001).  The more neutral “female genital cutting” is used here. 
2
 An alien is ineligible for asylum if he or she “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated 
in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
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grounds in order for his or her claim to prevail.3  The legal definition of 
persecutor and persecuted originally applied to the Nazi war criminal and 
Holocaust victim, respectively; in that context, the symmetrical provisions 
both apply.  In the nearly forty years that the persecutor bar has been used to 
bar asylum seekers, however, the relationship between persecutor and 
persecuted has proven to be less tidy.   
This comment explores the legal evolution of the persecutor bar 
within the original context of the Nazi war criminal and the bar’s application 
in modern contexts.  Part II describes the way in which the historical origins 
of the bar affected its development.  The Nazi war criminal/Holocaust victim 
dichotomy set up a clear-cut—some even argue, simplistic—contrast 
between persecutor and victim.  The practical difficulty of finding 
eyewitness testimony for events forty to sixty years in the past led to, among 
other developments, a broad reading of “participat[ion] in” persecution.  
Perhaps most important, the bar is set up structurally such that a finding of 
persecution presupposes a persecutor, a fact that posed little difficulty in the 
context of the Holocaust but is a presumption that leads to more troubling 
results in modern contexts. 
Part III looks at the way in which the persecutor bar does not map 
well to the political and cultural realities that give rise to modern 
“persecutors.”  In the context of civil war or civil unrest, the bar can be 
overinclusive, making ineligible for asylum child soldiers forcibly 
conscripted, or underinclusive, in the case of perpetrators whose violent acts 
do not constitute persecution because the acts do not target individuals on an 
enumerated ground.  However, U.S. courts’ treatment of combatants in 
situations of civil war or civil unrest suggests an alternate approach.  Courts 
may determine, in part for policy reasons, that an individual is ineligible for 
asylum at the same time his or her victims are not seen as having been 
persecuted.4  When a nexus to an enumerated ground is not established, there 
                                                                                                                              
group, or political opinion.”  I.N.A. § 208(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 
208.13(c), 1208.13(c). 
3
 In order to be granted asylum, an applicant must be determined to be a refugee.  I.N.A. § 
208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A).  A refugee is “any person who is outside any country of such 
person’s nationality . . . [or residence] who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”  I.N.A. § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
4
 This approach is illustrated in Matter of McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90 (B.I.A. 1984).  The 
respondent, a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, had participated in indiscriminate 
bombing campaigns, which the BIA held did not constitute persecution.  Id. at 96.  (Other activities 
targeting specific individuals, however, did amount to persecution.  Id. at 96-97.)  The court found 
McMullen ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal on the basis of his having committed a “serious 
nonpolitical crime,” which the court defined as an act “grossly out of proportion to the political objective or 
. . . involv[ing] acts of an atrocious nature.”  Id. at 97-98. 
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is no “persecution” under the INA; victims of indiscriminate violence, for 
example, are not eligible for asylum.  If the level of violence reaches killing, 
however, in spite of the fact that the violence may not be seen as “on account 
of” an enumerated ground, the perpetrator may still be ineligible for asylum.  
Courts have explained that, as a policy matter, we cannot shelter every 
individual subjected to random violence.  At the same time, we do not want 
to offer asylum to perpetrators of that violence.  This approach, essentially 
an uncoupling of persecuted and persecutor, allows for consideration of the 
offense itself and suggests a more nuanced approach that better accounts for 
practices that are called persecution but may be less straightforward than 
those anticipated by the persecutor bar as it was originally conceived. 
Two groups of individuals became presumptive persecutors in 1996, 
when forced abortion/sterilization and female genital cutting (FGC) were 
designated “persecution”: doctors and others who participated in forced 
abortions/sterilizations in China and women and others who perform FGC.5  
Part III documents the political genesis of these changes in immigration law 
and compares these persecutors to the threshold test established by the 
Supreme Court in an early use of the persecutor bar involving the 
denaturalization and deportation of a Nazi war criminal. 
Part IV discusses the way in which these politically motivated 
changes to the INA undermine the legitimacy of the persecutor bar and 
explores the problematic nature of labeling whole categories of individuals 
as “persecuted.”  One perhaps unintended consequence of such wholesale 
categorization is the corollary exclusion of other groups of individuals as 
persecutors.  The comment ends by exploring the more nuanced approach 
suggested by the courts’ treatment of civil war combatants—independent 
consideration of persecution and persecutor. 
II. THE PERSECUTOR BAR’S FORM AND EVOLUTION REFLECT ITS ORIGINAL 
TARGET—THE NAZI WAR CRIMINAL CONCEALING HIS PAST 
A. A Brief History of the Persecutor Bar 
The persecutor bar in immigration law arose in response to 
Congressional concern that, in the midst of the political and social upheaval 
that followed the end of World War II, Nazi war criminals were entering the 
United States undetected.  At the end of World War II, roughly eight million 
                                           
5
 The persecutor bar has not yet been applied in this context but certainly could be, as FGC has been 
designated “persecution.”  See below for a discussion of this issue. 
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people had become wards of the Allied powers;6 one million either could not 
or did not want to return to their homes.7  The Displaced Persons Act of 
1948 (DPA)8 and Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (RRA)9 together led to the 
admission of more than 400,000 people to the United States.10  The DPA 
barred former Nazis from entering the United States as well as “any person 
. . . who is or has been a member of or participated in any movement which 
is or has been hostile to the United States or . . . any person who advocated 
or assisted in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, or 
national origin.”11  The RRA similarly included a provision barring aliens 
who had participated in the persecution of others.12  The INA, enacted in 
1952, made subject to deportation those who had entered the United States 
by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact.13  Thus, individuals 
who had concealed their wartime past when applying under the DPA or RRA 
were deportable. 
The Holtzman Amendment of 197814 was intended to respond to the 
difficulty of prosecuting Nazi war criminals who had come into the country 
under INA provisions other than the DPA and RRA, for example, as spouses 
of U.S. citizens.15  Before the Holtzman Amendment was passed, wartime 
criminals could be deported only if they had entered the country under the 
DPA or RRA and were shown to have been excludable on admission due to 
fraud or misrepresentation.16  The Holtzman Amendment added a new 
ground of exclusion in I.N.A. § 212(a)(33) and a new ground of deportation 
in I.N.A. § 241(a)(19):17 any alien who, in conjunction with the Nazi 
government or an associated government, “ordered, incited, assisted, or 
                                           
6 Matthew Lippman, The Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United States and in Other Anglo-
American Legal Systems, 29 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 1, 13 (1998). 
7
 Michael J. Creppy, Nazi War Criminals in Immigration Law, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 443, 444 
(1998). 
8
 Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 2, 62 Stat. 1009, amended by Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (1950). 
9
 Pub. L. No. 203, § 6, 67 Stat. 400. 
10
 Lippman, supra note 6, at 49. 
11
 262 Stat. 555 (1950). 
12
 Pub. L. No. 203, § 6, 67 Stat. 400. 
13
 I.N.A. § 340(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), allows for the revocation of citizenship if citizenship was 
“procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.” 
14
 Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2065 (1978). 
15
 Creppy, supra note 7, at 448. See also Petkiewytsch v. I.N.S., 945 F.2d 871, 876 (6th Cir. 1991). 
16
 Lippman, supra note 6, at 52. In Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 509 (1981), a 
denaturalization action against a former Ukrainian accused of being a wartime persecutor, Justice Marshall 
defined misrepresentation as “material” if disclosure of the true facts would have made the visa applicant 
ineligible.  A “material” misrepresentation in this context was modified to mean a representation that 
“ha[d] a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of [the agency].”  
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988).  
17
 These provisions are now codified as I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E), and I.N.A. 
§ 237(a)(4)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D). 
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otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, 
religion, national origin, or political opinion” was now deportable.  
With the Refugee Act of 1980,18 Congress sought to provide a 
comprehensive, ideologically-neutral approach to defining “refugee.”19  
Those who fit the internationally accepted definition of “refugee”20 could be 
granted asylum.  Again, Congress excluded those who had participated in 
persecution.21 
B. The Historical Genesis of the Persecutor Bar Shaped Its Evolution 
The persecutor bar evolved in denaturalization and deportation cases 
against former Nazi war criminals after the enactment of the Holtzman 
Amendment in 1978.  Some of the tests that developed can be traced to the 
practical challenge facing prosecutors of proving defendants’ participation in 
crimes that allegedly had been committed forty to sixty years earlier.22  
These tests would prove inapt, particularly when used to bar the modern 
persecutor. 
                                           
18
 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
19
 Katherine L. Vaughns, Retooling the “Refugee” Definition: The New Immigration Reform Law’s 
Impact on United States Domestic Asylum Policy, 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 41, 59 (1998).  See also 
Matter of McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 97 (B.I.A. 1984) (“[I.N.A. §§] 101(a)(42) and 243(h)(2)(A), by 
excluding from the definition of ‘refugee’ persons who have participated in the persecution of others, [are] 
parallel and are consistent with the fundamental principles embodied in the United Nations 1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.  This exclusion from refugee status 
under the Act represents the view that those who have participated in the persecution of others are 
unworthy and not deserving of international protection”). 
20
 The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1(A)(2), defines a refugee as an 
individual who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country . . .” and, under 
Art. 1(F)(a), does not include anyone who has “committed . . . a war crime, or a crime against humanity.”  
189 U.N.T.S. 150, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ refugees.htm.  Although the convention 
was adopted July 28, 1951, and entered into force April 22, 1954, the United States has not yet ratified it.  
Under the INA, the term refugee is similarly defined as “any person who is outside any country of such 
person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . that country because of persecution 
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion. . . .  The term “refugee” does not include any person who ordered, 
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  I.N.A. § 101(a)(42)(A), (B); 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), (B). 
21
 See I.N.A. § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).  The Immigration Act of 1990 included a 
further bar against persons who had committed genocide.  See I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(E)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(E)(ii). 
22
 As the trial court noted in United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 907 (D. Fla. 1978), “In 
addition to the grave identification deficiencies of the Government’s case, there are many other grave flaws 
in the identification testimony of the Government’s witnesses as well as the credibility problems.  Perhaps 
it is understandable that there are flaws in identification evidence after 35 years.” 
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1. In the Threshold Test, the Court Rejected the Defense of Involuntary 
Service 
In Fedorenko v. United States,23 the Supreme Court considered the 
denaturalization case of a former concentration-camp guard in Nazi-
occupied Poland who claimed he had served involuntarily.  The Court 
attempted to define the meaning of “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise 
participated” in the context of involuntary service.  When challenged with 
the problem of prisoners working at the camp, who, for example, led other 
prisoners to the place where they were to be murdered, the Court 
distinguished this activity from “assisting” persecutors as follows: 
an individual who did no more than cut the hair of female 
inmates before they were executed cannot be found to have 
assisted in the persecution of civilians.  On the other hand, there 
can be no question that a guard who was issued a uniform and 
armed with a rifle . . . who was paid a stipend and was regularly 
allowed to leave . . . fits within the statutory language about 
persons who assisted in the persecution of civilians.24 
Fedorenko thus established a threshold test that asks whether an individual’s 
behavior rises to the level of an armed, uniformed camp guard.25  While 
direct responsibility for wartime atrocities might not be necessary to show 
participation, support of a more tangential nature was held to be insufficient.  
Circuit courts are split on the issue of whether the defendant’s 
personal involvement must be proven to show participation in persecution.  
Some courts have inferred assistance based on the general nature of an 
individual’s wartime activity, for example by attributing participation based 
on evidence establishing membership in a military unit known to have 
committed atrocities.26  For example, the Seventh Circuit held that a 
Lithuanian native who had failed to disclose his service in a military 
battalion had assisted the Nazis in their persecution of civilians.  Although it 
could not be proven that he had personally participated in the unit’s 
                                           
23
 449 U.S. 490 (1981). 
24
 Id. at 512 n.34. 
25
 Lippman, supra note 6, at 76.  Note that Fedorenko involved the revocation of citizenship, a far 
more serious proceeding than denial of asylum.  See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 509 (1981).  
The court in Xie v. I.N.S., 434 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 2006), for example, compares the petitioner’s claim 
that his conduct was involuntary with the Fedorenko test but points out that the government’s burden of 
proof is higher in a citizenship-revocation proceeding compared to a proceeding involving asylum or 
withholding of removal. 
26
 United States v. Ciurinskas, 148 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 1998).  See also Naujalis v. I.N.S., 240 
F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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execution of suspected Jews and Communists, the court held that he had 
assisted in persecution by dint of having contributed to the overall strength 
of the battalion.27  Constructive knowledge of persecution also has been 
considered sufficient: the Third Circuit, for example, affirmed the trial 
court’s finding that Kowalchuk, a clerk with a local police unit in Nazi-
occupied Lithuania, must have been aware that he was assisting in the Nazis’ 
persecution of Jews.28 
A few circuit courts have narrowed the interpretation given to the 
phrase “assisted, or otherwise participated in” as a ground for 
denaturalization and deportation.29  The Ninth Circuit, in Laipenieks v. 
I.N.S., required the government to show the defendant’s personal 
involvement in persecution, which the court held could include participation 
or assistance.30  The court concluded: “without proof of at least one instance 
in which Laipenieks’s investigations resulted in the ultimate persecution of 
an individual because of his political beliefs, we are unable to infer that such 
occurred.”31  The court has similarly required that an applicant have had 
personal knowledge of persecution in order to be held “culpable to such a 
degree that he could be fairly deemed to have assisted or participated in 
persecution.”32  In United States v. Sprogis, the Second Circuit held that the 
defendant, a Latvian police officer who had paid farmers to transport Jews 
and had witnessed over one hundred Jews being led to their execution, 
“passively accommodated the Nazis, while performing occasional 
ministerial tasks” and therefore should not be subject to denaturalization.33   
The Sixth Circuit ruled that “persecution” under the Holtzman 
Amendment required active participation beyond assistance and reversed the 
deportation order of Petkiewytsch, who was a civilian guard at a “labor 
education camp” and claimed he performed his duties under duress, never 
                                           
27
 Naujalis, 240 F.3d at 647.  Similarly, in United States v. Reimer, 356 F.3d 456, 461 (2d Cir. 
2004), the court held that the alien’s service, whether or not voluntary, as an armed guard outside 
expropriated Jewish property as well as his armed presence at the site at which Jews were murdered, even if 
he fired over the heads of the victims, was “assistance in persecution.”  Serving as a guard at a 
concentration camp, absent evidence of personal involvement in atrocities, was seen as “persecution” in 
Schellong v. U.S. I.N.S., 805 F.2d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 1986).  For similar holdings rejecting lack of personal 
involvement in persecution as a defense, see Kulle v. I.N.S., 825 F.2d 1188, 1191 (7th Cir. 1987); United 
States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253, 1257-58 (7th Cir. 1991); Kairys v. I.N.S., 981 F.2d 937, 942-43 (7th Cir. 
1992); and Hammer v. I.N.S., 195 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1999). 
28
 United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1985). 
29
 Lippman, supra note 6, at 71-72. 
30
 750 F.2d 1427, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985). 
31
 Id. at 1437. 
32
 Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 
806, 813 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
33
 763 F.2d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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shot his rifle, and never abused a prisoner.34  Thus, the question remains 
whether membership alone in an organization that has been shown to have 
engaged in persecution is enough to constitute assistance in that persecution.  
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has determined that the court 
should look at the “objective effect” of the persecution35 and has concluded 
that “assisted” may include compelled assistance.36 
2. Practical, Policy, and Historical Realities Influenced the Legal 
Evolution of the Persecutor Bar 
Government attorneys prosecuting Nazi war criminals after the 
passage of the Holtzman Amendment faced the monumental task of 
producing eyewitness testimony decades after the fact.  A broad 
interpretation of what constituted assistance in persecution, including mere 
membership in a group known to have committed wartime atrocities, 
considerably eased the burden on the government to produce witnesses to 
those atrocities.37  The mere fact of documented membership constituting 
“assistance” also “elevate[d] the interests of the victims over the equitable 
claims of the defendant[s],”38 who in many cases had become longtime 
productive members of American society.39  The evolution of the law, then, 
was rooted in part in both practical and policy concerns peculiar to the 
prosecution of Nazi war criminals.   
The traditional persecutor cases also are straightforward, analytically 
speaking, in part because the prosecutions have been selective: the Office of 
Special Investigations (OSI), a team of attorneys and historians created to 
enforce the Holtzman Amendment, has investigated approximately fifteen 
hundred cases of suspected Nazi collaborators since its inception in 1971.40  
                                           
34
 Petkiewytsch v. I.N.S., 945 F.2d 871, 872, 880-81 (6th Cir. 1991).  
35
 See Matter of Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 464-65 (B.I.A. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 
Laipenieks, 750 F.2d at 1427.  
36
 Matter of Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 69-70 (B.I.A. 1984). 
37
 Lippman, supra note 6, at 63.  See also Michael Pavlovich, A Nazi War Criminal as a Standard 
Bearer for Gender Equality?—The Strange Saga of Johann Breyer, 10 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 
319, 331 (2004).  
38
 Lippman, supra note 6, at 77. 
39
 See, e.g., United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 896 (D. Fla. 1978). 
40
 Susan H. Lin, Aliens Beware: Recent United States Legislative Efforts to Exclude and Remove 
Alien Human Rights Abusers, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 733, 740 (2001).  The Department of Justice also 
keeps a “watch list” of approximately two hundred Japanese war criminals from World War II who are 
barred from entering the United States.  Some were members of the notorious Unit 731, an army 
detachment in Manchuria that conducted medical experimentation on prisoners of war and civilians.  The 
unit also has been linked with establishing “comfort women stations” involving the sexual slavery of 
thousands of Japanese women.  U.S. Bars First Japanese Veterans for Crimes in World War II, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1996, at A13.  
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Of the suspects prosecuted, seventy-three have been denaturalized and fifty-
nine have been deported.41  OSI officials estimate that ten thousand Nazi war 
criminals entered the country illegally by deceiving officials charged with 
screening refugees in the chaotic years following the war.42  Prosecution by 
the OSI was necessarily selective.43  The absence of defense witnesses might 
also have played a part: as the trial judge pointed out in Fedorenko, “[o]f 
course, no fellow Russian or Ukrainian who was at Treblinka and now in the 
United States is about to come forward to testify. This is particularly true 
because the instant case reputedly is the first of many against East European 
prisoner-guards now in the United States.”44 
The original persecutor/persecuted dichotomy presents a black-and-
white distinction, at least in what French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs 
referred to as our “collective memory.”45  The Nazis’ genocidal campaign 
resulted in the deaths of an estimated six million Jews.46  The Nazi 
persecutor—as a threshold type, the armed, adult concentration-camp guard 
defined in Fedorenko—and those who perished at his or her hand are the 
archetypal persecutor and persecuted.47  
                                           
41
 Press Release, Dep’t. Justice, Justice Department Moves to Revoke U.S. Citizenship of Former 
Nazi Ghetto Policeman Who Shot Jews (Jan. 8, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/press_room/press_ 
releases/. 
42
 The World: Q & A.; The Linnas Case: “The U.S. Was a Haven for Nazi War Criminals,” N.Y. 
TIMES, April 26, 1987, at § 4, p. 2. 
43
 Allan A. Ryan Jr., head of the OSI from 1980 to 1983, explained that the office culls through “an 
enormous amount of data on the people who made the Holocaust,” including original records from the 
1930s and 1940s.  Names and identifying information are compared against U.S. immigration records.  If a 
person is found to be alive in the United States, the Justice Department makes a decision whether to 
investigate. The World: Q & A, supra note 42. 
44
 Fedorenko, 455 F.Supp. at 909. 
45
 PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE 13 (1999) (quoting Halbwachs).  Novick 
explores the development of American thinking about the Holocaust, which he sees as black and white in 
its “moral simplicity.”  Id. at 10.  The “collective memory . . . reduces events to mythic archetypes.”Id. at 4. 
46
 LUCY DAWIDOWICZ, WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 403 (1975). 
47
 It should be noted in closing this discussion that trial courts have sometimes struggled with this 
black-and-white characterization, reflected in the mandatory application of the persecutor bar, when 
overseeing the denaturalization and deportation of ex-Nazi Americans.  Judge Roettger in United States v. 
Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 899, decried the media fiasco surrounding Fedorenko’s trial, which included 
chartered busloads of demonstrators chanting slogans outside the courtroom.  He described Fedorenko, who 
had been in the country twenty-nine years, as a “hard-working and responsible American citizen”  and 
dismissed the government’s charges based on equitable grounds.  Id. at 896.  Roettger noted that “never in 
six years on the bench has the court seen the Government indulge in such expenses.”  Id. at 899.  The point 
here is not to minimize the culpability of Nazi war criminals who entered the U.S. illegally after the war.  
The point is that judges sometimes have found the persecutor bar difficult to apply even in the case of the 
Nazi war criminal, in part because the bar assumes a black-and-white persecutor/victim dichotomy and in 
part due to the passage of time and the sometimes heated political context. 
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III. THE PERSECUTOR BAR DOES NOT MAP WELL TO MODERN CONTEXTS 
The case of the modern persecutor, in contrast, is rooted in 
contemporary circumstances that are often less straightforward.  Mapping 
the traditional threshold test of the concentration-camp guard established in 
Fedorenko onto actions of individuals in contemporary contexts is 
challenging.  Two modern examples of individuals the courts have deemed 
“persecutors” include combatants fleeing civil strife and doctors and others 
who have participated in forced abortions or sterilizations in China. 
Although the courts have not yet barred as a persecutor an individual who 
has performed female genital cutting, the finding that FGC is persecution 
makes that a clear possibility.  The persecutor bar, on its face and as it has 
evolved, can be an inapt tool when applied in these modern contexts. 
A. Applied to Those Fleeing Civil War or Civil Strife, the Persecutor Bar 
is Both Over- and Underinclusive; Still, Its Use in this Context 
Suggests a Promising Approach 
The historical context that led to the establishment of the persecutor 
bar only vaguely resembles today’s chaotic, internal armed conflict.48  As 
one scholar put it, “[t]he majority of refugees in the world today are . . . 
fleeing civil conflicts in which the distinction between oppressor and 
oppressed is often unclear.”49  Courts apply the persecutor bar, nevertheless, 
to exclude individuals who bear little resemblance to the threshold 
concentration-camp guard.  However, the government’s approach to civil-
war combatants, which can involve independent consideration of persecution 
and persecutor, suggests a more flexible approach that could be applied in 
other contexts.  
1. “Duress Is No Defense” and Other Elements of the Persecutor Bar 
Led to the Exclusion of Applicants Less Culpable than the Threshold 
Nazi Persecutor 
The persecutor bar has been used to exclude individuals who meet the 
tests as they have evolved but who fall far short of the threshold Nazi 
                                           
48
 At any given time, approximately 110 continuing, violent political conflicts are under way in the 
world.  About thirty of these are wars involving the deaths of more than one thousand soldiers.  The Carter 
Center, Peace Programs: International Conflict Resolution and Management, http://www.cartercenter.org/ 
peaceprograms/program12.htm. 
49
 Matthew Happold, Excluding Children from Refugee Status: Child Soldiers and Article 1F of the 
Refugee Convention, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1131, 1131 (2002) (citing UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR  REFUGEES, REFUGEES BY NUMBERS 8 (2000)). 
JANUARY 2007 THE PERSECUTOR BAR IN U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW  237
concentration-camp guard.  The bar has been applied, for example, to deny 
asylum to child soldiers forcibly conscripted and coerced to commit 
atrocities in the chaotic civil insurgencies typical of contemporary wars.  
Two examples are discussed below.  Forcible conscription provides no 
defense to the persecutor bar, and, as noted above, “assisted” may include 
compelled assistance.50  Furthermore, since age was not at issue in the 
context of the Nazi war criminal, age is not mentioned in the text of the bar 
and therefore provides no defense.51 
The case of Aseged Daniel Kebede illustrates the point that youth 
does not preclude being designated a persecutor.52  Kebede was a member of 
the Oromo tribal group, which was persecuted during the Marxist 
dictatorship of Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile-Mariam.  Kebede’s 
father and uncle were arrested and presumed killed by government forces. 
From 1985 to 1987, when Kebede was between 12 and 14 years of age, he 
was repeatedly imprisoned and tortured.  Following his release from prison 
in 1987, he was conscripted into the Ethiopian army and was compelled, 
under threat of death, to fire on civilians—to “shoot anything that moved.”  
In 1993, Kebede was denied asylum and was ordered deported as a past 
persecutor.  In 2000, the BIA dismissed his appeal.53 
Individuals acting in service of repressive governments but who have 
not personally engaged in persecution also may be subject to exclusion or 
deportation under the persecutor bar.  Relying on a broad reading of 
“assistance,” for example, the Fourth Circuit upheld the deportation of Luis 
Higuit, a Philippine native who had served as an intelligence operative under 
the Marcos regime.54  The court found that even if Higuit had never 
“physically tortured or harmed any person,”55 persecution was not limited to 
                                           
50
 Laipenieks v. I.N.S., 750 F.2d 1427, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985). 
51
 Happold argues that the analogous provision in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (which precludes an individual from asylum who has “has committed a crime against peace, a 
war crime, or a crime against humanity”) did not distinguish between children and adults because “its 
drafters failed to consider that the article might be applied to children.”  Happold, supra note 49, at 1133. 
52
 Facts from this unpublished case are from Matter of Aseged Daniel Kebede, 26 Immig. Rptr. B1-
170 (B.I.A. 2003). 
53
 The BIA reopened Kebede’s case in 2003 and remanded it to an immigration judge for 
reconsideration.  In a concurring opinion, Board Member Espenoza noted first that the majority opinion 
“failed to provide guidance to the Immigration Judge” on the issue of Kebede’s exclusion as a past 
persecutor.  Id.  She cited Matter of A—G—, 19 I. & N. Dec. 502 (B.I.A. 1987), for the proposition that 
governments may require military service of their citizens provided the citizens are not children.  She noted 
that international law, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, prohibits nations from permitting or 
requiring children to serve as soldiers.  Because Kebede was a child at the time he allegedly committed the 
atrocities that led to his exclusion as a persecutor and because he acted under threat of death, Espenoza 
held, he should not be disqualified from asylum.  Kebede, 26 Immig. Rptr. B1-170. 
54
 Higuit v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2006). 
55
 Id. at 421. 
 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL  VOL. 16 NO.1 238
inflicting actual physical harm.  Higuit’s information, the court held, had led 
to the torture, imprisonment, and death of leftist New People’s Army party 
members.  His assistance was thus “genuine” rather than 
“inconsequential.”56  While Higuit’s participation cannot be seen as wholly 
innocent, his behavior arguably is not equivalent to that of the original test 
case—an armed, adult Nazi concentration camp guard.  The contexts are 
entirely different: in Nazi Germany, camp guards participated in industrial 
genocide.  In the Philippines, the New People’s Army, designated a terrorist 
organization by the U.S. State Department, aimed to overthrow the 
government and was credited with the assassination of Philippine security 
forces, politicians, and judges.57  Higuit’s culpability as an informer, 
particularly since he was not personally involved in the persecution, 
arguably falls short of the Fedorenko test case.58 
2. The Independent Consideration of Persecution and Persecutor in the 
Case of Civil War Combatants Suggests a Helpful Approach 
For policy reasons, the United States does not admit individuals 
victimized by indiscriminate violence associated with civil war or civil 
strife.59  Individuals fleeing civil war are eligible for asylum only if targeted 
“on account of” an enumerated ground.60  If all acts of violence in civil war 
and strife were considered persecution, participants on either side could be 
characterized as persecuted and be eligible for asylum.61  Alternatively, 
combatants on either side might be deemed persecutors of the opposing side 
and be ineligible for asylum.  Until persecution rises to the level of killing, 




 U.S. State Department, Foreign Terrorist Organization: Redesignation of Communist Party of the 
Philippines/New People’s Army, Aug. 9, 2004, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/35046.htm. 
58
 The more subjective approach of the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits is based on the notion that 
the government should prove personal involvement before an individual is held accountable for 
persecution.  See, e.g., United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115, 115 (2d Cir. 1985); Petkiewytsch v. I.N.S., 
945 F.2d 871, 880-81 (6th Cir. 1991); Laipenieks v. I.N.S., 750 F.2d 1427, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985). 
59
 See, e.g., Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, 19 I. & N. Dec. 509, 512 (B.I.A. 1988) (“[T]hose fleeing 
general conditions of violence and upheaval in their native countries [do] not qualify for asylum”), rev’d on 
other grounds, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989). 
60
 I.N.A. § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). See Maldonado-Cruz, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 
512; Campos-Guardado v. I.N.S., 809 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1987). 
61
 See Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811, 816 (B.I.A. 1988); Matter of Fuentes, 19  
I. & N. Dec. 658, 661-62 (B.I.A. 1988).  A civil war context does not automatically exclude an applicant 
from the protection of refugee law if the persecution against that individual is targeted.  The respondent in 
In Re H—, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (1996), for example, was held by the BIA as having been persecuted on the 
basis of his identification with the Marehan subclan, associated with a former ruling faction in Somalia.  
The respondent’s father and brother had been summarily executed as members of the clan, and the 
respondent had been severely beaten.  Although this persecution arose during civil strife, the BIA found 
that the respondent presented a sufficiently individualized claim. 
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courts have drawn this line consistently.  When violence does include 
killing, courts may exclude the perpetrators on other grounds.   
In Laipenieks v. I.N.S., for example, the court distinguished between 
police activities in the service of legitimate political concerns and 
persecution of individuals on the basis of religion, race, national origin, or 
political opinion.  The court deemed legitimate the work of a police officer 
in Nazi-occupied Latvia who investigated those who had participated in the 
extermination of thousands of Latvians while Soviet authorities occupied the 
country.62  The court noted that interrogations conducted by the officer were 
“specifically structured to separate those who had participated in Soviet 
atrocities or were legitimately suspected of working in collusion with Soviet 
officials from those who were merely ideologically opposed to German 
rule.”63  Laipenieks admitted having occasionally struck prisoners.64  The 
court concluded, “Even if [it is true that the respondent struck prisoners], the 
government has failed to show that this persecution occurred because of the 
prisoner’s [sic] political beliefs.”65  Unless the defendant had beaten the 
prisoners on account of an enumerated ground, in other words, doing so 
would not amount to “persecution.”66 
Courts consistently decline to designate those victimized by 
indiscriminate violence as “persecuted”; however, those who admit having 
participated in violent internal conflict, if the violence rises to the level of 
killing, can be excluded as persecutors.67  The degree of culpability, in other 
words, factors into what amounts to persecution in the context of civil war.  
Individuals held ineligible for asylum as persecutors in the context of 
modern civil wars and civil strife, include, for example, a former Burmese 
soldier who participated in the summary execution of a Karen rebel prisoner 
of war,68 a former member of Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone 
who executed a prisoner and mutilated civilians,69 and a South Korean 
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 750 F.2d 1427, 1437 (9th Cir. 1985). 
63
 Id. at 1436. 
64
 Id. at 1434. 
65
 Id. at 1437 (emphasis in original). 
66
 Id. (explaining that the “statutory provision . . . remains unfulfilled by the government’s 
evidence”). 
67 When the government cannot establish the necessary nexus between the harm and one of the five 
grounds enumerated in I.N.A. § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), and the harm rises to a certain 
level of violence, other provisions of the I.N.A. may bar refugee eligibility.  See discussion of Matter of 
McMullen, supra note 4. 
68
 Johns v. I.N.S., 93 Fed. Appx. 157 (9th Cir. 2004). 
69
 Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003).  On appeal, the BIA concluded that Bah’s 
mutilation and killing of civilians “was on account of a protected ground [i.e., political opinion] because its 
objective was to overcome any inclination that non-combatants may have had to support the government.”  
Id. at 350. 
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military officer who was a “key figure” in the operation of detention 
facilities where political prisoners were interrogated, “re-educated” and 
sometimes killed.70  Although the BIA in Matter of Rodriguez-Majano 
noted: “[w]e do not believe Congress intended to restrict asylum and 
withholding only to those who [have] taken no part in armed conflict,”71 the 
only activities that have been deemed not to amount to persecution include 
“drafting of youths as soldiers, the unofficial recruiting of soldiers by force, 
the disciplining of members of a rebel group, or the prosecution of draft 
dodgers, . . . the attacking of garrisons, the burning of cars, and the 
destruction of other property.72  The traditional symmetry between what 
constitutes persecution for purposes of asylum and what amounts to 
behavior that is deemed persecution for purposes of excluding an alien as a 
persecutor, in other words, breaks down in the context of civil war.   
The uncoupling of persecutor and persecution makes sense in this 
context.  As a policy matter, not all victims of indiscriminate violence can be 
sheltered by the United States as asylees, and the mere fact that persecution 
takes place during civil war should not shield an individual persecutor from 
accountability.  Independent consideration of persecution and persecutor also 
allows the persecutor to be judged on a case-by-case basis.  Extending this 
approach to allow for a more flexible definition of “persecutor” would mean 
that only the most culpable would be excluded.  Child soldiers and those 
forcibly conscripted who only witness atrocities, for example, would not 
automatically be barred. 
In the case of civil war, then, the persecutor bar is both potentially 
under- and overinclusive.  It is underinclusive when perpetrators are shielded 
because their acts do not target individuals on an enumerated ground.  When 
the bar is applied to children and other individuals innocently caught up in 
chaotic civil strife, it is overinclusive in its reach.  The bar reaches too far in 
other contexts as well, particularly when the designation of a practice as 
“persecution” is a distinctly political result.  The following cases of doctors 
who perform forced abortion and women who perform FGC offer two such 
examples. 
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 Han v. I.N.S., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3854, 3-4 (9th Cir. 1997). 
71
 I. & N. Dec. 811, 816 (B.I.A. 1988). 
72
 Id. at 815. 
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B. When Applied to Doctors and Others Who Participate in Forced 
Abortion or Sterilization, the Persecutor Bar Can Be Overinclusive 
Like the symmetrical provisions that apply to the traditional 
persecuted and persecutor, INA provisions grant asylum to anyone who has 
been subjected to, or fears upon return, a forced abortion or sterilization and 
exclude those who performed or participated in the procedure.  The 1996 
Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 
amended I.N.A. § 101(a)(42)(A) to provide asylum eligibility to those 
persecuted for resisting coercive population-control policies.73  Doctors and 
others involved in enforcing these policies may not be granted visas or 
adjustment of status and are barred from asylum as past persecutors.74  The 
amendment is odd in its specificity; grounds for asylum are otherwise quite 
general.75  This section briefly explores the political genesis of asylum 
eligibility on the ground of forced abortion/sterilization and compares 
persecutors who are barred for having enforced China’s one-child policy 
with the traditional Nazi persecutor.    
1. Congress Designated Forced Abortion and Sterilization as 
“Persecution” Following Widespread Support from the Political Right 
For decades, being subjected to a forced abortion or sterilization was 
not seen as grounds for asylum in the United States.76  Until 1996, when the 
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 The provision states that “a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo 
involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure . . . 
shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well 
founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure . . . shall be deemed to have a well 
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.”  IIRIRA., Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601(a)(1), 
110 Stat. at 3009-689. 
74
 8 U.S.C. § 1182e makes ineligible for a visa or adjustment of status “any foreign national [who 
has] been directly involved in the establishment or enforcement of population control policies forcing a 
woman to undergo an abortion . . . or . . . a man or woman to undergo sterilization.”  This provision does 
not deny asylum to an applicant and was enacted as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2000 
and 2001, and not as part of the INA.  The Department of Homeland Security instead uses the persecutor 
bar under I.N.A. § 208(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), to bar an applicant from asylum who has 
participated in forced abortions or sterilizations. 
75
 In addition to designating unusually specific grounds for asylum, the forced abortion/sterilization 
provision deviated from traditional asylum law in another way: eligibility included those who already had 
been sterilized or subjected to an abortion—who might not necessarily fear, in other words, future 
persecution, as required by the INA: “the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the 
Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the 
alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  I.N.A. § 
241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).  See also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE 
LAW AND POLICY 960-61 (2005). 
76
 Isolated exceptions reflect contradictory administrative pronouncements between 1988 and 1996 
(discussed below).  See, e.g., Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 867 (E.D. Va. 1994) (overturning an 
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BIA issued In re S—P—,77 the United States had consistently denied asylum 
claims on the basis of opposition to forced abortion and sterilization.  For 
example, in a key 1989 decision, Matter of Chang, the BIA held that China’s 
one-child policy was not “on its face persecutive.”78  The court held that in 
order to establish an asylum claim, the petitioner would have to show that 
forced sterilization was threatened for some reason other than enforcement 
of the country’s population-control policy.79  As the BIA noted in a similar 
case: “Coerced abortions and sterilization are certainly horrible acts.  
However, . . . the applicant has failed to show that the one couple, one child 
policy was applied to him for reasons protected under the Act. . . .”80  The 
board saw China’s population-control measures as a reasonable response to 
China’s extraordinary population problem.81   
Other commentators have documented the politics surrounding the 
change in immigration law that designated forced abortion and sterilization 
per se persecution.  Most point to the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre 
of pro-democracy protestors by the Chinese Army as the tipping point.82  
The brutal suppression of the pro-democracy movement might better be 
seen, however, as an opening that made possible a change in immigration 
law long sought by the anti-abortion lobby in the United States.83  As 
Vaughns notes, “the issue of asylum relief on the basis of forced abortions 
was debated in the political branches of government at a time when the 
Constitutional right to a voluntary abortion was being hotly contested within 
the United States.”84   
                                                                                                                              
immigration judge’s decision to deny asylum to a Chinese national fearing sterilization upon return), 
overruled by Di v. Moscato, 66 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 1995).  See also Robert Pear, Chinese Foes of One-Child 
Plan Get U.S. Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1988, at § 1, p. 5 (reporting Attorney General Edwin Meese’s 
decision to grant three couples asylum based on their fear of persecution for having violated China’s one-
child policy); and Jim Mann, Ruling Could Allow More Chinese to Enter U.S., L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1989, at 
Pt. 1, p. 18 (documenting the granting of political asylum to a Chinese national who opposed China’s 
coerced family planning). 
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 21 I. & N. Dec. 486 (B.I.A. 1996). 
78
 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 43 (B.I.A. 1989). 
79
 Id. at 44. 
80
 Matter of G—, 20 I. & N. Dec. 764, 779 (B.I.A. 1993). See also Legomsky, supra note 75, at 959-
60.  
81
 Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 43-44 (“Chinese policymakers are faced with the difficulty of providing 
for China’s vast population in good years and in bad.  The Government is concerned not only with the 
ability of its citizens to survive, but also with their housing, education, medical services, and the other 
benefits of life that persons in many other societies take for granted.  For China to fail to take steps to 
prevent births might well mean that many millions of people would be condemned to, at best, the most 
marginal existence”). 
82
 See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 75, at 960; Vaughns, supra note 19, at 50. 
83
 See discussion below. 
84 Vaughns, supra note 19, at 46. 
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China had instituted its one-child-per-family policy in 1979 in an 
attempt to achieve zero population growth by the turn of the century.85  
Although the official policy was to use financial incentives and societal 
pressure to reduce the birth rate, the practice of holding local officials 
responsible for meeting regional quotas led to the use of coercive measures, 
including hefty fines, involuntary sterilization, and forced abortions.86  In the 
decades preceding the IIRIRA change, Sen. Jesse Helms (Republican from 
North Carolina) and others in Congress had been pushing against federal 
support—domestic or international—of abortion.87  In 1984, the Reagan 
Administration instituted the so-called “global gag rule” to deny funding to 
all family-planning services abroad that provided abortion-related 
information or services, whether or not these services were legal in the 
country at issue.88  The London-based Planned Parenthood Federation lost 
$15 million in American aid in 1984 because it refused to renounce abortion 
counseling.89  Senator Helms introduced a 1985 amendment to cut off 
funding for the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) due 
in part to reports regarding forced abortions in China; his larger concern was 
abortion itself.90  The bill that eventually became the INA provision 
stipulating that forced abortion or sterilization would be considered 
persecution on account of political opinion originally also included a 
provision that would deny funding to any organization that provided 
abortion services.91 
                                           
85 Kimberly Sicard, Section 601 of IIRIRA: A Long Road to a Resolution of United States Asylum 
Policy Regarding Coercive Methods of Population Control, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 927, 927-28 (2000). 
86 Vaughns, supra note 19, at 53-54.  Chinese officials admitted that female infanticide and forced 
abortion had occurred, but said in 1985 that these “shortcomings” were a thing of the past and that such 
practices had “been corrected.”  Julian Baum, China Reacts Angrily to U.S. Pressure on Population 
Control, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 11, 1985, at 11. 
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 In 1981, Senator Helms authored a bill (eventually tabled) to outlaw abortion at any time during a 
woman’s pregnancy.  Bob Dart, “Senator No” Hard to Ignore; Hot-button Issues Found Him at Fore; 
Jesse Helms Retirement, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 22, 2001, at 9A. 
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 This policy was rooted in a Helms amendment enacted in 1973, the year Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973), legalized abortion in the United States, that prevented any U.S. aid funds from being used for 
abortions overseas.  President Clinton repealed the “global gag rule” in 1993; President G.W. Bush 
reinstated it in 2001.  Laura Mansnerus, Abortion Rights Group Files Suit over Bush Family Planning Rule, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2001, at A1.  See also Zachary Coile, Vote against Abortion “Gag Rule”; Boxer’s Bill 
Rejects Reagan-Bush Policy, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Aug. 2, 2001, at A2. 
89 Family Planning; Abort It, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 9, 1985, at 37. 
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 Senator Helms’s proposed amendment contained the following provision: “The President . . . shall 
retain authority hereunder to implement whatever policies he deems necessary to curb human rights 
violations, including but not limited to infanticide, abortion, [and] involuntary sterilization. . . .”  Taiwan 
Central News Agency, Senator Urges U.S. to Help Curb Forced Abortions, Sterilization in Red China, 
June 11, 1985. 
91 H.R. 1561, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995). 
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The years 1988 through 1996 marked a period of political crossfire on 
the issue of whether an individual who had been victimized by coercive 
family planning should eligible for asylum.92  In 1988, Attorney General 
Edwin Meese issued guidelines to Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(“INS”) Commissioner Alan C. Nelson instructing asylum officers to give 
“careful consideration” to Chinese applicants fearing persecution on this 
basis.93  The BIA, arguing in Chang that the guidelines were directed at the 
INS and were not binding on the BIA or immigration judges, continued to 
deny asylum petitions on this basis.94  The Tiananmen Square massacre 
precipitated the passage of the Emergency Chinese Adjustment of Status 
Facilitation Act of 1989 (Chinese Relief Act),95 which included an 
amendment specifically meant to overrule Chang.96  President G. H. W. Bush 
vetoed the bill—fearing it would interfere with his administration’s 
diplomatic initiatives with China—but extended protection in his veto to 
those fleeing coerced family planning.97  A change of administration in 1992 
frustrated efforts by the Bush Administration to overrule Chang.98  Thus, 
until the enactment of IIRIRA in 1996, the BIA continued to apply its 
holding in Chang, denying asylum on the basis of forced 
abortion/sterilization. 
The political context surrounding this per se persecution provision is a 
strong indication of its ideological basis.  Given the pool of potential 
applicants,99 other commentators also have seen the one-thousand-person-
per-year cap on the number who could be granted asylum or admitted as 
refugees on this basis100 as indicative of the ideological, perhaps even 
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 One judge called the confusion engendered by conflicting attorney general guidelines and BIA 
decisions “an administrative cacophony undeserving of judicial deference.”  Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 
858, 867 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
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 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 3.1, 236.1, 236.3, 242.2(d), 242.8(a) (1988). See also Gerrie Zhang, U.S. 
Asylum Policy and Population Control in the People’s Republic of China, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 557, 578 
(1996). 
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 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 43 (B.I.A. 1989). 
95
 Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, H.R. 2712, 101st Cong. (1st Sess. 1989). 
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 See Di, 842 F. Supp. at 863 (discussing the Armstrong-DeConcini Amendment). 
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 See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, 
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1853 (Nov. 30, 1989).  See also Vaughns, supra note 19, at 50-51. 
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 See Zhang, supra note 93, at 581-85, for a detailed account of events. 
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 Since 1998, the second year the provision was available, the number of aliens eligible to receive 
asylum on this basis has far exceeded the one-thousand yearly cap.  Ruth Ellen Wasem, U.S. Immigration 
Policy on Asylum Seekers, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, updated Feb. 16, 
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cynical,101 nature of the provision.102  Including a cap that resulted in only 
token relief to those subjected to forced abortion suggests that this provision 
was an ideological tool used by the political right to broadcast disapproval of 
abortion generally.  The political underpinnings of the law threaten its 
legitimacy in other ways.  This topic will be taken up below, following the 
discussion of FGC, an asylum ground that drew its support from the 
opposite end of the political spectrum. 
2. Doctors and Others Who Participate in Forced Abortion or 
Sterilization Are Less Culpable than the Threshold Nazi Persecutor 
The doctor, nurse, assistant, or other individual who participates in 
forced abortion or sterilization is deemed a persecutor as a corollary of the 
INA provision that recognizes being subjected to a forced abortion or forced 
sterilization as persecution on account of political opinion.103  Cases 
involving persecutors in this context include doctors104 who performed 
forced abortions or vasectomies and a driver who transported women to 
hospitals where they underwent forced abortions.105 
As is the case with the traditional persecutor, a doctor may act 
involuntarily and still be considered a persecutor.  The doctor who argued 
that he was merely “doing [his] professional job . . . against [his] own 
will”106 and that “vasectomies were required and enforced by the Chinese 
government”107 was nonetheless found ineligible for asylum.108  Similarly, 
the doctor who stated that his participation was involuntary because he was 
under orders of his military superiors was barred from asylum109 as was the 
driver who maintained that his conduct was involuntary.110 
Like the Nazi war criminal, the doctor or other participant in a forced 
abortion/sterilization is a state actor.  Indeed, in In re C—Y—Z—, the BIA 
explicitly compared the practice of forced abortion to Dr. Mengele’s 
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experiments under the Nazis, noting that “[f]orced surgical procedures 
which offend fundamental human rights standards are not any less a form of 
torture or persecution because they happen to coincide with a governmental 
objective.”111 
However, the notion that forced abortion or sterilization is a 
transparent human rights violation, as obvious as the persecution of the Jews 
under Nazi Germany, is undermined by the fact that the U.S. government 
refused to grant asylum on this ground for decades, until 1996.  The BIA 
itself stated that enforcement of China’s one-child policy was a legitimate 
response to the country’s extraordinary need to aggressively reduce 
population growth.112  Until political pressure prompted the adoption of 
IIRIRA in 1996, the U.S. government withheld judgment on this practice, 
which it saw as an instrument of a foreign state’s public policy. 
Furthermore, given the broad reading of “participation,” the bar does 
not distinguish between the doctor who personally performs forced abortions 
and sterilizations and, for example, a driver who transports a woman to a 
clinic where she undergoes a forced abortion.  Zhang Jian Xie, recently 
excluded as a persecutor, drove unwilling women to forced abortions.113  
The first few times he transported such women, he was accompanied by 
unarmed guards; when unaccompanied, he released a woman in response to 
her pleas.114  He was consequently fired from his job.115  The Second Circuit 
held that in determining whether someone participated or assisted in 
persecution for the purposes of the INA, it “look[s] . . . to his behavior as a 
whole.  Where the conduct was active and had direct consequences for the 
victims, we conclude[ ] that it was ‘assistance in persecution.’”116  Here, the 
respondent was held to the “objective effect” standard articulated in Matter 
of Laipenieks.117 
The BIA’s initial rejection of forced abortion and sterilization as 
grounds for asylum as well as the politics surrounding the change in 
immigration law that designated these procedures “persecution” call into 
question the legitimacy of labeling participants “persecutors.”  The BIA’s 
initial ambivalence about the procedures means that in some cases applicants 
later denied asylum as persecutors were performing forced abortions or 
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sterilizations before the procedures had been named “persecution.”118  
Furthermore, a broad reading of “participation,” rooted in the use of the 
persecutor bar to prosecute Nazi war criminals, results in an overinclusive 
application of the bar, making peripheral participants, such as the driver Xie, 
ineligible for asylum.  Thus, while being subjected to or fearing forced 
abortion or sterilization arguably might constitute a straightforward case of 
persecution, this designation should not automatically result in the exclusion 
of those who perform these procedures as persecutors.  A more flexible 
approach is needed to allow for case-by-case consideration of individual 
culpability. 
The following practice, FGC, deemed persecution in 1996, and the 
presumptive “persecutors” who may be barred for having participated in the 
procedure, offers another example of a modern context in which the 
persecutor bar is an inappropriate tool of exclusion. 
C. Applied to Women Who Perform FGC, the Persecutor Bar Would Be 
Overinclusive 
Courts have not yet applied the persecutor bar to exclude an FGC 
practitioner seeking asylum.  However, because FGC has been deemed 
“persecution,” anyone who has “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise 
participated in” the procedure is, by definition, a persecutor.119  A brief 
description of the procedure is followed by a discussion of the political 
genesis of the law designating FGC persecution and a comparison of the 
possible use of the persecutor bar in this and other modern contexts. 
In the landmark case In re Kasinga,120 the BIA held that Fauziya 
Kassindja,121 a young Togolese woman fleeing FGC, was eligible for asylum 
based on persecution as a member of a social group.122  FGC is a procedure 
that varies widely in severity and geographical distribution.123  Widespread 
                                           
118
 E.g., this is true in the case of Zhang Jian Xie (Xie, 434 F.3d at 136), and Yu Yuan Zheng (Zheng 
v. B.I.A., 119 Fed. Appx. 321, 321 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
119
 I.N.A. § 208(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i). 
120
 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996). 
121
 INS officials misspelled Kassindja’s name when she arrived in New York in 1994. FAUZIYA 
KASSINDJA & LAYLI MILLER BASHIR, DO THEY HEAR YOU WHEN YOU CRY (Delta) 171 (1998).  The 
misspelling carried through the adjudication of her case. 
122
 The social group was narrowly defined to include “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe 
who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.”  Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 
at 358. 
123
 The most common procedure involves removal of the labia minora and clitoris.  The more extreme 
version, “infibulation,” involves the removal of all external genitalia; a small opening is left for the passage 
of menstrual blood and urine.  WHO, Female Genital Mutilation: What is Female Genital Mutilation? 
(June 2000), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/. 
 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL  VOL. 16 NO.1 248
in Africa, the procedure also is practiced in the Middle East and Asia.124  
Typically, an elderly woman in the community performs the procedure on a 
girl who is between the ages of five and twelve.125  Anesthetics and 
antiseptics generally are not used.126  Immediate consequences of FGC in its 
most severe form can include hemorrhaging and infection, which can lead to 
infertility and death; women sometimes suffer long-term health 
consequences that force them to seek ongoing medical attention.127  The 
Seventh Circuit in Nwaokolo v. I.N.S. noted that FGC is “a horrifically brutal 
procedure” that has physical and psychological consequences.128 
1. FGC Was Designated as a Ground for Asylum Following Widespread 
Support from the Political Left 
The designation of FGC as persecution, like the provision establishing 
forced abortion and sterilization as persecution, was a cause taken up in the 
political arena.  In 1996, shortly before Congress enacted IIRIRA following 
an intense lobbying effort by the political right, FGC was recognized as 
persecution by the BIA in Kasinga after widespread lobbying and media 
attention from the political left.  International and domestic human rights, 
women’s rights, and refugee-advocacy communities had been working for 
recognition of FGC as a form of gender persecution for many years before 
the BIA labeled the practice “persecution.”  The attempt to eradicate FGC 
became a prominent cause in left politics after the practice was discussed in 
an international human rights forum held in Khartoum, Sudan, in 1979, at 
the World Health Organization Seminar on Traditional Practices Affecting 
the Health of Women and Children.129  In 1984, women from two dozen 
African nations publicly opposed the practice at the Inter-African Committee 
at the Seminar on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and 
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Children in Dakar, Senegal, calling FGC a violation of human rights and 
documenting its serious health consequences.130   
The domestic media campaign gathered steam in 1992.  That year saw 
the creation of Equality Now, an international women’s rights group based in 
the United States.131  Equality Now publicized the case of a Saudi Arabian 
woman who became the first person to be granted asylum in Canada on the 
basis of gender-related persecution.132  In 1992, Pulitzer Prize-winning 
author Alice Walker wrote Possessing the Secret of Joy, a novel exploring 
the physical and psychological brutality of the practice.133  A year later, 
Walker produced a documentary film about FGC, Warrior Marks: Female 
Genital Mutilation and the Sexual Blinding of Women.134  
At the 1995 U.N. Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, 
First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton spoke of FGC as a “painful and 
degrading practice” and “a violation of human rights.”135  The conference 
Platform for Action called for the elimination of the practice.136  At the 
Beijing conference, Surita Sandosham, Director of Equality Now, met with 
Layli Miller Bashir, one of the American University law students who took 
on Kassindja’s case.137  Sandosham explained to Bashir that Equality Now 
was targeting the eradication of FGC both internationally and among 
immigrant groups in the United States.138  The organization would help 
Kassindja publicize her story, delivering a letter from Kassindja to 
Representative Pat Schroeder (Democrat from Colorado), soliciting ongoing 
media attention, and garnering signatures in support of Kassindja’s release 
from detention.139 
Kassindja arrived in the United States after the political groundwork 
already had been laid that would support her cause.  While she waited in 
detention for her hearing before the BIA, her story was picked up by major 
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American media.  It appeared on the front pages of the New York Times140 
and the Washington Post,141 among other national newspapers, and was 
discussed in the Atlantic Monthly.142 After her release from detention 
pending the outcome of her appeal, Kassindja appeared on the news program 
Nightline, on CNN and CBS, and was interviewed on National Public 
Radio.143  Sandosham and Mimi Ramsey, an anti-FGC activist, met with 
Schroeder to discuss the Kassindja case.144  Renowned feminist Gloria 
Steinem invited Kassindja to visit her at home.145  Representatives Schroeder 
and Barbara-Rose Collins of Michigan co-sponsored legislation 
criminalizing FGC in the United States.146  Senator Harry M. Reid 
(Democrat from Nevada) introduced parallel legislation passed in May 1996, 
weeks before Kasinga was decided.147 
While a groundswell of support from either end of the political 
spectrum precipitating a change in immigration law does not, in itself, 
undermine the validity of the law, it should give us pause.  Although this 
topic is taken up generally below, it is important to point out the 
consequences of singling out a particular cultural practice over others as 
persecution.  As the INS rightly noted in its Kasinga brief to the BIA, the 
question is not whether FGC is “deeply objectionable”148 or presents a valid 
object of “vigorous human rights protest,”149 but whether it gives rise to a 
valid asylum claim under the INA.  The INS suggested a new framework for 
granting asylum in cases involving cultural claims—that the practice “shock 
the conscience”150—which the BIA rejected.151  Even under this test, would 
asylum then be available to male Australian aboriginal youths who undergo 
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brutal initiation rites including genital cutting,152 to individuals forced into 
sexual slavery in Thailand153 or forced into marriage in Pakistan,154 or to 
women who are required to wear certain clothing?155  As Kennedy points 
out, designating FGC “persecution” allows the FGC victim to jump queue156 
ahead of other, possibly more deserving, applicants and opens the door to a 
wide variety of interventions on cultural grounds.  Allowing cultural 
practices to constitute persecution also results in the mandatory exclusion of 
those who participate in these practices. 
2. Women Who Perform FGC Are Less Culpable than the Threshold Nazi 
Persecutor 
The problematic consequence of designating FGC “persecution”—the 
automatic creation of a category of persecutors—is anticipated in a footnote 
in a concurring opinion in Kasinga.  Board Member Filppu notes that “it 
might . . . be anomalous if persons facing death in their homelands because 
of religious or political persecution were denied protection for having 
‘assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution’ of their children 
simply by virtue of being parents of FGM victims and having followed tribal 
custom.”157  It might be anomalous to exclude a parent as a persecutor who 
would otherwise qualify for asylum; however, the persecutor bar does 
exactly that.  If FGC is persecution, “assisting, or otherwise participat[ing]” 
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in the procedure defines an individual as a persecutor.  Given the broad 
reading of “assisting” that developed in the original persecutor cases 
involving Nazi war criminals, the “persecutor” label potentially could be 
applied to any number of community members who assist or are complicit in 
the FGC procedure, particularly if the issue is the “objective effect” of their 
participation.158 
Both the U.S. government brief and the BIA opinion in Kasinga 
anticipate the stance, promoted in this comment, that FGC should be 
regarded “persecution” without a concomitant “persecutor.”  The INS brief 
chronicles the short- and long-term adverse health consequences of FGC.159  
The government concludes, “[f]emale genital mutilation therefore can 
amount to persecution even if the subjective intention of the one who would 
perform the circumcision is ostensibly benign.”160  As the INS put it, 
“[p]resumably, most of its practitioners believe that they are simply 
performing an important cultural rite that bonds the individual to the 
society.”161  This last sentence was picked up by the BIA in Kasinga without 
comment.162 
FGC is a private (as opposed to state) practice, unlike forced abortion.  
Whether or not the FGC practitioner should be labeled a persecutor reflects 
the current debate in the literature regarding private, cultural practices that 
may be human rights violations.  Some posit that FGC is a straightforward 
case of “torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and child abuse.”163  
Others agree and object generally to the human rights community deferring 
to the practice because it is subsumed under the concept of “culture,”164  
while other political and civil rights are seen as operating in the public, 
universal sphere.165  As Schroeder put it: “If it happens to you for racial 
reasons, it’s a human rights violation.  If it happens to you for political 
reasons, it’s a human rights violation.  If it happens to a woman, it’s 
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cultural.”166  Others, such as Mutua, call for an “agnostic” approach to the 
practice and criticize the West for presuming that human rights reflect a 
“universal morality.”167  Mutua sees the West as attempting to play “savior” 
to the FGC “savages” and “victims.”168  A new framework for nontraditional 
violations of human rights that constitute persecution under U.S. 
immigration law would resolve the controversy in favor of the persecuted 
without automatically excluding the persecutor. 
The importance of a more nuanced approach to FGC, including a 
case-by-case consideration of practitioners of the ritual, is further supported 
by the fact that “female genital cutting” might encompass a wide range of 
diverse practices.  In Indonesia, for example, the procedure is reportedly far 
less invasive than that practiced in many parts of Africa.  A study conducted 
in Jakarta and West Java described the procedure there as “ritualistic [and] 
largely non-invasive.”169  If FGC is deemed per se persecution, then those 
who participate in less severe forms of FGC might be subject to exclusion 
under the persecutor bar. 
IV. UNCOUPLING “PERSECUTION” FROM THE “PERSECUTOR” WOULD 
PROVIDE A PRINCIPLED FRAMEWORK FOR BARRING PERSECUTORS FROM 
ASYLUM 
A more principled framework for defining “persecutors” is necessary 
to restore legitimacy to the persecutor bar.  The political genesis of the 
changes to immigration law as well as the ill-fitting persecutor bar itself 
work to undermine the legitimacy of the persecutor label.  Politically-
motivated changes to immigration law defy the intended political neutrality 
of refugee law.170  Immigration laws favoring special-interest political 
groups disrupt the orderly formulation of policy and encourage the 
balkanization of asylum law,171 which privileges some over the many others 
who deserve asylum.172  Such laws are inevitably inconsistent, as one 
practice is deemed persecution over another.   
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Neither forced abortion nor FGC fit cleanly under the existing 
definition of “persecution”: persecution must be on account of race, religion, 
political opinion, or particular social group.  In the case of forced abortion, 
Congress simply added a new, oddly specific ground in I.N.A. § 101(a)(42).  
In the case of FGC, the social group has grown to encompass those both 
fearing or having been subjected to FGC—in short, to include all women in 
ethnic groups that practice FGC who are opposed to the practice.  Human 
rights organizations estimate that daily six thousand girls and women are 
subjected to FGC.  Many more could be said to “participate in” the practice; 
whole villages celebrate the annual ritual.173  Who will be designated a 
persecutor for having participated?  The consequence of labeling FGC as 
“persecution” is as yet unclear.   
One consequence, however, is certain: under the persecutor bar, the 
practitioners of both forced abortion/sterilization and FGC are automatically 
barred from asylum.  Should this consideration act as a limit on a finding of 
persecution?  Another possibility suggests itself in the approach to civil war 
combatants—independent consideration of the persecutor and persecuted.  
This more nuanced approach recognizes that the modern persecutor and 
persecuted may not be as easily identified as the Nazi war criminal and 
Holocaust victim.  It accounts for the chaotic nature of modern civil 
insurgencies.  It takes into consideration the decades-long position of the 
U.S. government denying asylum on the ground of forced abortion or 
sterilization and recognizes the political genesis of the reversal represented 
by IIRIRA.  It acknowledges the political nature of the change to 
immigration law that singled out FGC from among many objectionable 
cultural practices. 
Uncoupling persecution from the persecutor makes it possible to 
reject an agnostic, culturally relativistic approach to practices that “shock the 
conscience,”174 such as forced abortion and FGC.  Divorcing consideration 
of the practice from the practitioner allows us to avoid demonizing the latter, 
whose intent might very well be benign.  At the same time, it allows the 
United States to shelter those who separate themselves from these practices, 
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which we rightly recognize as human-rights violations.175  Finally, this 
approach allows the courts to evaluate the individual persecutor’s behavior, 
taking into account equitable defenses, on a case-by-case basis.  
As it stands, the persecutor bar admits no exception or defense.  Once 
an asylum applicant has been determined to have “ordered, incited, assisted, 
or otherwise participated” in persecution, he or she is barred from asylum.176  
As written, the law automatically bars from asylum the abducted child 
soldier who kills civilians in a chaotic civil war, the driver who transports 
women to forced abortions, and the woman who performs FGC.  The actions 
of these “persecutors” simply do not rise to the level of the threshold 
persecutor—the adult, armed, concentration-camp guard Congress intended 
to target with the Holtzman Amendment.  Congress should amend the 
persecutor bar.  Its application should be discretionary, both to allow for 
consideration of equitable defenses and to allow for a more flexible 
approach in the case of practices that rightly constitute persecution but 
whose practitioners fall short of the traditional persecutor’s culpability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The persecutor bar, enacted in 1978, was meant to rout out Nazi war 
criminals who had slipped into the United States after World War II.  The 
definition of persecution is based on the International Refugee Convention, 
also written in the aftermath of the Holocaust.  “Refugee” is meant to be an 
ideologically neutral designation: anyone who has been persecuted and fears 
repatriation, whatever the political context, is supposed to find shelter in the 
country of his residence.  The persecutor bar assumes an archetypal victim 
and persecutor, and the Nazi war criminal and Holocaust victim fit both 
sides of the equation.  The selective prosecution of Nazis by the Office of 
Special Investigations sustained that clear-cut relationship.  The historical 
nature of the proceedings further contributed to the evolution of the law to 
include, for example, a broad reading of “assisted” and “participated in” and 
to exclude a defense of duress.  
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The modern application of the bar is problematic.  In the civil war 
context, conventional warfare has been replaced by civil strife that often 
involves widespread, indiscriminate violence in situations in which the 
oppressed may be indistinguishable from the oppressors.177  Such is the case 
when children are abducted into rebel armies and commit atrocities.  The bar 
as applied to civil war combatants can be both overinclusive, in the case of 
participants forcibly conscripted, and underinclusive, in the case of those 
who have persecuted others but not on an enumerated ground.  In the latter 
case, the government responds in some cases by excluding the persecutor on 
another ground, such as having committed a “serious nonpolitical 
offense.”178  The separate consideration of persecution and persecutor should 
be extended to other contexts. 
Applying the persecutor bar to doctors who perform forced 
abortion/sterilization and (perhaps in the future) to women who perform 
FGC is especially troublesome.  Designating whole categories of individuals 
as persecuted, particularly when the designations are politically motivated, 
undermines and brings disorder to the law and disadvantages other aspiring 
immigrants who must face individual scrutiny.  
Uncoupling the automatic exclusion of the “persecutor,” given a 
designation of “persecution,” suggests a more nuanced approach that would 
restore legitimacy to the persecutor bar, which has been undermined both by 
its inapplicability to persecutors in modern contexts and by politically 
motivated changes to the INA.  Congress should amend the persecutor bar to 
allow for a consideration of culpability and equitable defenses on a case-by-
case basis.  Doing so would allow this country to shelter those fleeing 
harmful practices without demonizing the practitioners. 
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